Using two randomized field experiments, we examine how warning borrowers that their loan performance will be reported to a public credit registry affects their loan take-up and repayment decisions. We show that credit warnings increase loan take-up rates. Reducing incumbent lenders'...

Most people rely on fast thinking to make decisions. Fast thinking focuses on the most prominent information available, potentially ignoring critical factors in favor of less relevant, but salient details (Kahneman 2011). The primary obstacle to studying fast thinking is identifying and...

We document the propensity of Standard & Poor's 500 index companies to just meet, rather than overshoot or just miss, performance targets in CEOs' annual incentive plans to boost cash bonuses. The statistical anomaly occurs only in the 4th quarter and is robust to alternative assumptions of...

We study optimal effort and compensation in a continuous-time model with three-sided moral hazard and cost synergies. One agent exerts initial effort to start the project; the other two agents exert ongoing effort to manage it. The project generates cash flow at a fixed rate over its lifespan;...

We study how compensation committees set CEOs' earnings performance goals in annual incentive plans (AIPs) and their implications for managers' strategic earning guidance behavior. We find corporate boards rely on earnings forecasts provided by both financial analysts and managers in setting...

We show that large public companies in the United States change the assumptions of the benefit formulas of the defined benefits pension plans for their top executives in anticipation of plan freezes and executive retirements. In particular, on average top executives receive a boost in annual...

We show that increases in CEO compensation at new S&P 500 members affect CEO compensation at other firms through compensation peer benchmarking. This compensation contagion propagates via three channels. Direct competition for managerial talent forces firms to respond to peers' pay increases....

We find that over 20% of CEOs appointed at S&P 1500 firms from 1992 to 2010 came from 36 CEO factories. CEOs originated from CEO factories, factory CEOs, have significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns at the appointment announcement than do non-factory CEOs. We show that CEO factories...