The Conflict Analysis approach by Hipel and Fraser (1984) is well equipped to model repeated games. Players are assumed to posses a sequential reasoning that allows them to ( not necessarily correctly) anticipate the reaction of other players to their strategies. An individual's best response...

The Conflict Analysis approach by Hipel and Fraser (1984) is well equipped to model repeated games. Players are assumed to posses a sequential reasoning that allows them to (not necessarily correctly) anticipate the reaction of other players to their strategies. An individual’s best response...

This paper is based on Ille 2013. Both papers analyze the same model, but in contrast, this paper does not provide an analytical solution but rather resorts to simulations. This allows the reader, who is familiar with the former article, to retrace the results more thoroughly and without the...

This paper develops a simple dynamic, non-symmetric game between two player populations that can be generalised to a large variety of conflicts. One population attempts to re-write a current (social) contract in its favour, whereas the other prefers to maintain the status quo. In the model's...

This paper demonstrates how both quantitative and qualitative results of general, analytically tractable asset-pricing model in which heterogeneous agents behave consistently with a constant relative risk aversion assumption can be applied to the particular case of linear investment choices. In...

In this paper we study the dynamics of a simple asset pricing model describing the trading activity of heterogeneous agents in a stylized market. The economy in the model contains two assets: a bond with risk-less return and a dividend paying stock. The price of the stock is determined through...

We study the co-evolution of asset prices and individual wealth in a financial market populated by an arbitrary number of heterogeneous, boundedly rational agents. Using wealth dynamics as a selection device we are able to characterize the long run market outcomes, i.e. asset returns and wealth...

In an economic geography model where both a negative pecuniary and a positive technological externality are present, we introduce an explicit dynamics of firms locational choice and we characterize its long run distribution. Our analysis shows that economic activities evenly distribute when the...

We show that the playing sequence-the order in which players update their actions-is a crucial determinant of whether the best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we analyze the probability that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in random...

We present a new approach to the study of networks where the formation of links is driven by unilateral initiative of nodes. First, we propose a mathematical description of the extreme introvert and extrovert model (XIE), a dynamic network model in which the number of links fluctuates over time...