We show that the playing sequence-the order in which players update their actions-is a crucial determinant of whether the best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we analyze the probability that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in random...

This paper develops a simple dynamic, non-symmetric game between two player populations that can be generalised to a large variety of conflicts. One population attempts to re-write a current (social) contract in its favour, whereas the other prefers to maintain the status quo. In the model's...

This paper is based on Ille 2013. Both papers analyze the same model, but in contrast, this paper does not provide an analytical solution but rather resorts to simulations. This allows the reader, who is familiar with the former article, to retrace the results more thoroughly and without the...

The Conflict Analysis approach by Hipel and Fraser (1984) is well equipped to model repeated games. Players are assumed to posses a sequential reasoning that allows them to ( not necessarily correctly) anticipate the reaction of other players to their strategies. An individual’s best response...

Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 1978) considered a simple proximity model of segregation where individual agents only care about the types of people living in their own local geographical neighborhood, the spatial structure being represented by one- or two-dimensional lattices. In this paper, we argue...

We introduce a framework to analyze the interaction of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents repeatedly playing a participation game with negative feedback. We assume that agents use different behavioral rules prescribing how to play the game conditionally on the outcome of previous rounds. We...

The widespread evidence of multiple bank lending relationships in credit markets suggests that firms are interested in setting up a diversity of banking links. However, it is hard to know from the empirical data whether a firm's observed number of lenders is symptomatic of financial constraints...

In the last years, many contributions have been exploring population learning in economies where myopic agents play bilateral games and are allowed to repeatedly choose their pure strategies in the game and, possibly, their opponents in the game. These models explore bilateral stage-games...

We study a local version of the Minority Game, where agents are placed on the nodes of a directed graph. Agents care about being in the minority of the group of agents they are currently linked to and employ myopic best-reply rules to choose their next-period state. We show that, in this...

Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 1978) considered a simple model with individual agents who only care about the types of people living in their own local neighborhood. The spatial structure was represented by a one- or two-dimensional lattice. Schelling showed that an integrated society will generally...