Showing 1 - 10 of 14
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625175
Let Fi h(k, n) be the ith ordered configuration space of all distinct points H1, . . . ,Hh in the Grassmannian Gr(k, n) of k-dimensional sub- spaces of Cn, whose sum is a subspace of dimension i. We prove that Fi h(k, n) is (when non empty) a complex submanifold of Gr(k, n)h of dimension i(n -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009660505
A toric arrangement is a finite set of hypersurfaces in a complex torus, every hypersurface being the kernel of a character. In the present paper we prove that if TfW is the toric arrangement defined by the cocharacters lattice of a Weyl group fW, then the integer cohomology of its complement is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008729036
Here the reader can find some basic definitions and notations in order to better understand the model for social choise described by L. Marengo and S. Settepanella in their paper: Social choice among complex objects. The interested reader can refer to [Bou68], [Massey] and [OT92] to go into more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008729168
A toric arrangement is a finite set of hypersurfaces in a complex torus, every hypersurface being the kernel of a character. In the present paper we build a CW-complex S homotopy equivalent to the arrangement complement Rx, with a combinatorial description similar to that of the well-known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008729073
Marengo and the second author have developed in the last years a geometric model of social choice when this takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, showing that by bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority has the power of determining the social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008729132
We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008729160
In [MP08] L. Marengo and C. Pasquali present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained. In this paper we extend and generalize this approach by providing a geometric model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008729573
We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009558504
The paper presents a new framework to assess firm level heterogeneity and to study the rate and direction of technical change. Building on the analysis of revealed short-run production functions by Hildenbrand (1981), we propose the (normalized) volume of the zonotope composed by vectors-firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010202776