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We are concerned with the design of a constitution for a firm - an ex ante contract which assigns residual rights of control (and possibly residual income rights) without reference to the issue to be decided. We focus attention on two polar constitutions: non-profit cooperatives and outside...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928786
We develop a model of hierarchies based on the allocation of authority. A firm's owners have ultimate authority over a firm's decisions, but they have limited time or capacity to exercise this authority. Hence owners must delegate authority to subordinates. However, these subordinates also have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744898
The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745454
In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of 'incomplete contracting'. However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746414
We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit not to consider outcomes not on the list, i.e., these are "ruled out". Ex post, they freely bargain over outcomes on the list, i.e., the contract specifies no mechanism to structure their choice; in this sense outcomes on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746644