This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the social-welfare loss that results from the regime's inability to...

This paper studies the effect of ownership structure on workers' incentives for investing in firm-specific human capital. Particularly, we analyse such incentivers and monitoring under employee ownership and capitalist ownership. In our model, the employee-owned firm is a firm bought by its...

Interactions between economic development and financial development are studied by looking at the roles of financial institutions in selecting Ramp;D projects (including for both imitation and innovation). Financial development is regarded as the evolution of the financing regimes. The...

This paper centres around the question of ownership of firms and managerial competition and how these affect manager and employees' incentives to invest in human capital. We argue that employee's incentives in human capital investment are affected by both ownership and competition since both...

We model the coordination of specialised tasks inside an organisation as quot;attribute matchingquot;. Using this method, we compare the performance of organisational forms (M-form and U-form) in implementing changes such as innovation and reform. In our framework, organisational forms affect...