Fishers are risk-averse according to most empirical studies, while expected-utility theory predicts risk neutrality even for sizable stakes. We test this prediction using data from a stated-choice experiment with Swedish commercial fishers. Our results show that only 48% of the fishers can be...

This paper uses data from an actual fishery to construct a tractable, dynamic model to compare expected profit and its variance, optimal stock size, optimal harvest rate, and optimal fishing effort under different management regimes under uncertainty. The results provide a comparison of...

Economic theory predicts that the least-efficient vessels are more likely to exit a fishery following the transition to an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management regime. Tools are needed to help analysts predict the likely degree and distribution of consolidation prior to implementing...

What happens when an environmental NGO (ENGO) becomes involved in fisheries management, and its involvement is recognized by the managing authorities? The answer depends on the preferences and the measures of the ENGO. We use a bioeconomic objective function where fishers and regulator have...

Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) induce changes along both the extensive margin—via consolidation of quota among fewer vessels—and the intensive margin, as harvesters adjust their behavior to ITQ incentives. We use ITQ introduction in the Bering Sea crab fishery to decompose the sources...

In the 1970s, herring stocks in the Northeast Atlantic were nearly fished to extinction. This collapse is usually attributed to technological advances. We investigate the empirical impact of technological shocks on herring stocks. We show evidence that the power block was the principal factor in...

Valderrama and Anderson (2007) presented an analysis of rotational fishing for sea scallops which unrealistically assumed high fixed price premiums for large sea scallops independent of their supply, and atypical initial conditions. These assumptions distort their results, leading them to...

Traditional fisheries management schemes generate incentives for vessels to maximize catch, resulting in rent dissipation and overcapacity. Individual vessel quota management schemes change the incentives to maximize profit and have the potential to generate resource rent and reduce capacity. An...

In industries where firms can adjust product mix in response to price changes, the process can be delayed by adjustment costs. An example is fishermen who change fishing grounds to target different species. If adjustment costs are sufficiently large, this may hamper the fishermen’s response so...

Total Allowable Catch (TAC)-regulating schemes have been introduced in most fisheries. TAC distribution following the Proportional Rule, based on historical catches, implies that harvesters or vessel groups that have captured more in the past and contributed to overfishing are getting larger...