We examine the willingness to donate depending on whether “misery” is random generated or self-inflicted by too high demands in bilateral negotiations. We find that randomness has a positive influence on the total amount of donation. In case of self-inflicted “misery” we observe that...

A variety of different social contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as different degrees of social interdependence may affect people's distributional preferences, and this contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process...

We conduct a field experiment on direct and indirect transfer mechanisms. It shows that people are willing to donate significantly more if the donation is indirect, i.e., it is tied to the purchase of a good with a price premium, rather than made directly. This points to an...

This paper deals with social acceptance of applying the equity principle for intra-familial time transfers. Based on a representative survey among German citizens, the author provides empirical evidence on acceptance of financial compensation for different time transfers. Some 80% of the...

Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, altruistic self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and contribution to the production of public goods in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories trying to explain human prosocial preferences and behavior. Many of...

While it is well established that individuals and groups make different economic decisions, the reasons for the behavioral differences are still not fully understood. We experimentally compare individual and group behavior in a competitive setting where cheating can be used to outperform the...

Aggression is displaced when provocations cannot be directly retaliated against and when it is redirected towards a target innocent of any wrongdoing. While this phenomenon is widespread, it has not been widely explored in experimental economics. We fill this gap and find that a sizeable...

We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning...

Industrial organization is mainly concerned with the behavior of large firms. Experimental industrial organization therefore faces a problem: How can firms be brought into the laboratory? The main approach relies on framing: Call individuals firms! This experimental approach is not in line with...