Showing 1 - 10 of 81
symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery, one may wonder which punishment strategy is more effective in curbing … design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment recipients are less likely to grant the socially … undesirable favor, while bribers are more likely to report to the authorities with asymmetric punishment. In addition, when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009487845
) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081462
, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about others …' behavior. We investigate punishment in a world with “reasonable doubt” about others' contributions. Interestingly, people … level of a setting without punishment. Our findings suggest that sufficient information accuracy about others' behavior is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144995
Under common law, the standard remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages. Under continental law, the standard is specific performance. The common law solution is ex post efficient. But is it also ex ante efficient? We use experimental methods to test whether knowing that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954015
Public goods are dealt with in two literatures that neglect each other. Mechanism design advises a social planner that expects individuals to misrepresent their valuations. Experiments study the provision of the good when preferences might be non-standard. We introduce the problem of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012943146
On the doctrinal surface, there is a deep divide between common and continental law when it comes to the origin of contractual obligations. Under continental law, in principle a unilateral promise suffices. Common law by contrast requires consideration. When it comes to deciding cases, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949226
Originally, behavioral law and economics was an exercise in exploring the implications of key findings from behavioral economics (and psychology) for the analysis and reform of legal institutions. Yet as the new discipline matures, it increasingly replaces foreign evidence by fresh evidence,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014161485
The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial allocation of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014131106
We study experimentally whether and to what extent impartial decision makers are influenced by stakeholders’ fairness opinions in an allocation decision. The setting allows for different focal fairness rules to be considered. We compare communication treatments, in which one of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147415
This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in … when subjects can vote on the institutional setting. We find that punishment is significantly higher when the sanctioning … institution is exogenous, which can be explained by a difference in the effectiveness of punishment. Subjects respond to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903425