Showing 1 - 10 of 22
In this paper, we consider a model that suggests that the theory of exchange with asymmetric information seems suitable to provide a possible explanation model of occurrence and duration of civil wars. We show that although civil conflicts are not Pareto optimal ex post they may be Pareto...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107840
Agglomeration can be caused by asymmetric information and a locational signaling effect: The location choice of workers signals their productivity to potential employers. The cost of a signal is the cost of housing at that location. When workers' marginal willingness to pay for housing is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108365
We exploit exogenous variation in the amount of public information available to banks about a firm to empirically evaluate the importance of adverse selection in the credit market. A 2006 reform introduced by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) reduced the amount of public information available to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108966
This paper examines the effect of information sharing on supply chain configuration where the market characterized by demand uncertainty. A dynamic multi-stage game theoretic model with incomplete information is employed to capture the sequence of events. Our supply chain consists of two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109348
Agglomeration can be caused by asymmetric information and a locational signaling effect: The location choice of workers signals their productivity to potential employers. The cost of a signal is the cost of housing at that location. When workers' marginal willingness to pay for housing is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109616
We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259275
In a dynamic model of optimal security design, we show when firms should preserve "equity capacity" through choosing high target leverage or "debt capacity" through choosing low target leverage. Thereby, firms reduce a problem of underinvestment or overinvestment when they must raise future...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259963
This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey (1927)and Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)) to a competitive economy in which markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. Insurance markets are prime examples: consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113168
Individuals can insure themselves perfectly against uncertainty about the length of life by purchasing deferred annuities early in life. In the absence of other uninsurable uncertainties (e.g. income), there will be no residual purchases or sales of annuities later in life, thereby avoiding any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114494
The aim of this paper is to study what is the best structure of a Board of Directors when collusive aspects between the Board and the CEO are taken into account. We analyze how shareholders should select the members of the Board in a framework with asymmetric information and uncertainty about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368168