The paper examines the timing of endogenous wage setting under Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed duopoly. The results are that when the public firm chooses the timing of wage setting: (1) sequential wage setting is the outcome and (2) simultaneous wage setting is the outcome. The first...

This paper investigates Bertrand competition of unionized mixed duopoly when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm, including endogenous imposition of the budget constraint on the public firm. Thus, we show that if the public firm's inefficiency is sufficiently small, no...

This study investigates social welfare and privatization depending on the government's preference for tax revenues and the timing of wage setting in either a unionized-mixed or a unionized-privatized duopolistic market. We show that bargaining over wages is always sequential regardless of who...

We investigate government subsidy policies in which a home firm and a foreign firm choose to strategically set prices or quantities in a third market. We show that even though each firm can earn higher profits under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition regardless of the nature of...

By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into unionized mixed duopolies, this paper investigates how the preference can change the government's choice of tax regimes between ad valorem and specific taxes. Main results are as follows. Given that one of the tax regimes is...