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Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111607

Concern for relative position, rank-order contests, and contributions to public goods

Zenginobuz, Unal - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1996

We study the consequences of concern for relative position and status in a public good economy. We consider a group of agents who are engaged in a contest for position whereby a set of rewards are distributed according to relative status. The extent of concern for rewards, together with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005616789

Communication and Efficiency in Competitive Coordination Games

Cason, Timothy; Sheremeta, Roman; Zhang, Jingjing - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending …. As a result, intra-group communication decreases while inter-group communication increases payoffs. Our experiment thus …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113027

Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

A contest is a situation in which individuals or groups expend costly resources while competing to win a specific prize. The variety of economic situations that can be described as contests has attracted enormous attention from economic theorists. Despite the extensive theoretical research of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259262

Do Women Panic More Than Men? An Experimental Study on Financial Decision

Kiss, Hubert Janos; Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We report experimental evidence on gender differences in financial decision that involves three depositors choosing between waiting or withdrawing their money from a common bank. We find that the position in the line, the fact of being observed and the observed decisions are key determinants to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259526

You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups

McCarter, Matthew; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

of member change on performance? To answer these questions we conduct an experiment in which we investigate the effect of … first part of the experiment, and then two members of the group are replaced with new participants, and the newly formed … group plays the game for the second part of the experiment. Our results show that the arrival of newcomers decreases trust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259957

Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict

Kimbrough, Erik; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a … them and then still choose to enter conflict; however, our experiment reveals that some individuals use this non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260731

Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution

Kimbrough, Erik; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015

Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123534

Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination

Lahno, Amrei Marie; Lahno, Bernd - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

resulting restrictions in using private information. We report results from a laboratory experiment in which teams were given a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108615

Behavior in Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Standard theoretical prediction is that rational economic agents participating in rent-seeking contests should engage in socially inefficient behavior by exerting costly efforts. Experimental studies find that the actual efforts of participants are significantly higher than predicted and that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109372