Similar Search Results

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111607

The Role of Expectations and Gender in Altruism

Rigdon, Mary L.; Levine, Adam Seth - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

A central question in the study of altruism has been whether there is a systematic gender difference in giving behavior. Most experimental economics research has found that women are more generous than men. Evidence also suggests that gender differences depend upon the price of giving: males are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008587466

Communication and Efficiency in Competitive Coordination Games

Cason, Timothy; Sheremeta, Roman; Zhang, Jingjing - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending …. As a result, intra-group communication decreases while inter-group communication increases payoffs. Our experiment thus …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113027

Do Women Panic More Than Men? An Experimental Study on Financial Decision

Kiss, Hubert Janos; Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We report experimental evidence on gender differences in financial decision that involves three depositors choosing between waiting or withdrawing their money from a common bank. We find that the position in the line, the fact of being observed and the observed decisions are key determinants to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259526

You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups

McCarter, Matthew; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

of member change on performance? To answer these questions we conduct an experiment in which we investigate the effect of … first part of the experiment, and then two members of the group are replaced with new participants, and the newly formed … group plays the game for the second part of the experiment. Our results show that the arrival of newcomers decreases trust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259957

Too smart to be selfish? Measures of intelligence, social preferences, and consistency

Chen, Chia-Ching; Chiu, I-Ming; Smith, John; Yamada, Tetsuji - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

also have access to the grade point averages (GPA) and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) outcomes of our subjects. We find …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360254

The endogenous nature of the measurement of social preferences

Smith, John - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

Measures of preferences are primarily useful in that they are helpful in predicting behavior. We perform an experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530719

Do the right thing: But only if others do so

Bicchieri, Cristina; Erte, Xiao - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. Bicchieri (2006) argues that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think ought to be done (normative expectations). Little...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619816

Minimal Social Cues in the Dictator Game

Rigdon, Mary; Ishii, Keiko; Watabe, Motoki; Kitayama, … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

This paper reports results of an incentivized laboratory experiment manipulating an extremely weak social cue in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621662

Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity

Bonein, Aurélie; Serra, Daniel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621794