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Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

first stage but not in the second stage. Our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject’s utility …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258638

Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence

Shupp, Robert; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259038

Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman; Turocy, Theodore - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109043

Behavior in Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Standard theoretical prediction is that rational economic agents participating in rent-seeking contests should engage in socially inefficient behavior by exerting costly efforts. Experimental studies find that the actual efforts of participants are significantly higher than predicted and that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109372

Behavioral Dimensions of Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

The standard theoretical description of rent-seeking contests is that of rational individuals or groups engaging in socially inefficient behavior by exerting costly effort. Experimental studies find that the actual efforts of participants are significantly higher than predicted in the models...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111074

Endowment Effects in Contests

Price, Curtis; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

given a large per-experiment endowment rather than when the endowment is given per-period. Risk-aversion and non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111405

Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

This paper experimentally compares the performance of four simultaneous lottery contests: a grand contest, two multiple prize settings (equal and unequal prizes), and a contest which consists of two subcontests. Consistent with the theory, the grand contest generates the highest effort levels...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112044

Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests?

Sheremeta, Roman; Zhang, Jingjing - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can better comply with theoretical predictions than … individuals in contests. Our experiment replicates previous findings that individual players significantly overbid relative to … individual players. The new findings of our experiment are that groups make 25% lower bids, their bids have lower variance, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113095

An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258037