The present study analyses the dynamics of a nonlinear Cournot duopoly with managerial delegation and bounded rational players. Problems concerning strategic delegation (based on relative performance evaluations) have recently received in depth attention in both the theoretical and empirical...

We determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-period timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the...

This paper considers a two-stage game, where in the first stage, two firms bid non-cooperatively for a production technique that leads to a reduction in cost. Following the auction in the second stage of the game these firms compete against each other in a duopolistic industry. The amount of...

This paper models the possible effects over the market price of a homogeneous good when there is a merger. The analysis will be made with two scenarios: (i) using technologies homogenous between firms, (ii) and with any degree of heterogeneity. It is assumed an linear inverse function of demand...

This paper contains an analysis of stylised natural gas and electricity supply sectors. Power plants operate either on natural gas or on a competing fuel – e.g. oil. The competing fuel is assumed to be traded at world market price whereas natural gas is sold by a national monopoly. The paper...

This paper extends the standard model of bundling as a price discrimination device to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, firms have an incentive to introduce a bundling discount when demand for the bundle is...

There are many examples of markets involving two groups of participants who need to interact via intermediaries. Moreover, these intermediaries usually have to compete for business from both groups. Examples include academic publishing (where journals facilitate the interaction between authors...

Collusion sustainability depends on firms' aptitude to impose sufficiently severe punishments in case of deviation from the collusive rule. We extend results from the literature on optimal collusion by investigating the role of limited liability. We examine all situations in which either...