We investigate whether the adoption of the euro was accompanied by an increase in prices in member countries, and whether it promoted goods market arbitrage in the form of faster convergence to a common price. By comparing the experience of eurozone countries to non-euro European countries in a...

In an environment in which bureaucratic burden and delay are exogenous, an individual firm may find bribes helpful to reduce the effective red tape it faces. The “efficient grease” hypothesis asserts therefore that corruption can improve economic efficiency and that fighting bribery would be...

This paper investigates whether foreign institutional investors in emerging markets can enhance shareholder value. We pay special attention to two dimensions of investor heterogeneity: whether an investor declares itself as an activist, and whether an investor comes from a country with a strong...

We suggest it may be "too easy" to attribute real exchange rate movements to law of one price deviations. We show that it is immaterial whether one uses seemingly traded goods, nontraded goods, or even just a single, unimportant consumer good, say beer. The ease of attributing the variation to...

Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators and thus to further company goals by encouraging favorable policies and/or outcomes. Using data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, this study examines corporate lobbying activities from a financial...

This paper studies exchange rate pass-through in South Africa at the most disaggregated level possible. To accomplish this, two distinct panels of disaggregated data are employed. The first data set contains annual prices of 158 individual goods and services at the consumer level from 1990 to...

We examine the response of equity mutual fund flows to sovereign rating changes in a wide sample of countries during the crisis prone years from 1996-2002. We find that Sovereign downgrades are strongly associated with outflows of capital from the downgraded country while improvements in a...

We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Moreover, we find that earnings quality has no predictive power for the likelihood of establishing connections. Hence, we rule out that our...

Recent studies have documented systematic exchanges of favors between politicians and firms, and that connected firms, on average gain from political ties. Since these ties are often to a top manager or large shareholder, agency problems are likely more severe for politically connected firms....