Institutions are important for the analysis of the association between the deficits and inflation. This study used central bank independence and financial markets as institutional variables to investigate whether deficits are inflationary or not in the presence of dependent central bank and...

The hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve has been criticized for lacking a micro-foundation. In this paper, an alternative purely forward-looking model of the Phillips curve is constructed on the basis of a micro-foundation of trend inflation. In addition, another source of output gaps other than...

Through an investigation of selected jurisdictions, this paper aims to contribute to the extant literature in investigating the relationship between central bank independence and price stability, as well as how such a relationship varies between different jurisdictions – even though it is...

In this paper, I present a unified and micro-founded explanation for various types of inflation without assuming ad hoc frictions or irrationality. The explanation is similar to the conventional inflation theory in the sense that an independent central bank can control inflation and also similar...

This paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes by testing for the presence of political monetary cycles between 1972 and 2001. This is the first study of its kind to include not only advanced countries but also a large sample of developing nations...

Recently, it has been argued that trend inflation may be the solution to the puzzle of inflation persistence in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). However, incorporating trend inflation into the NKPC raises another serious problem—it lacks a microfoundation. The paper presents a...

We contrast the influence of demography and central bank independence on inflation. The recent demographic trends in developed countries are shown to weight more on inflation than central bank independence, while the contrary stands for the period from 1960 to 1979.

Most explanations for the necessity of an independent central bank rely on the time-inconsistency model and therefore assume that governments are weak, foolish, or untruthful and tend to cheat people. The model in this paper indicates, however, that an independent central bank is not necessary...

Employing data from 13 Latin American countries, we find that greater central bank independence is associated with lesser intervention in the foreign exchange market, and also with leaning-against-the-wind intervention. We also find that the structural reforms that occurred in Latin America...

We reconsider Svensson’s inflation-targeting proposal in a model where the need to raise seigniorage revenues determines the socially optimal inflation rate and distortionary taxes cause the inflation bias. Interpreting the targets as contracts, we show that the interaction between fiscal and...