Experimental evidence suggest that people only use 1-3 iterations of strategic reasoning, and that some people systematically use less iterations than others. In this paper, we present a novel evolutionary foundation for these stylized facts. In our model, agents interact in finitely repeated...

In this paper, in order to study the strategic interactions between “cooperation”, “defection” and “altruistic punishment”, a mutation-selection dynamic, with the Prisoner's Dilemma as the background, has been established on an embedded Markov chain, proved the following conclusions:...

Experimental evidence suggest that people only use 1-3 iterations of strategic reasoning, and that some people systematically use less iterations than others. In this paper, we present a novel evolutionary foundation for these stylized facts. In our model, agents interact in finitely repeated...

In this paper, in order to study the strategic interactions between “cooperation”, “defection” and “altruistic punishment”, a mutation-selection dynamics, with the Prisoner's Dilemma as the background, has been established on an embedded Markov chain, proved the following...

The efficiency wage theory developed by Akerlof (1982) assumes observability of effort and the ability of firm and worker to commit on their effort/wage decisions. We show that, from a game theoretical point of view, we have to understand the firm/worker relationship as a repeated Prisoner's...

In contrast to the existing literature, which explains the recurrent cost problem as largely the result of institutional impediments to LDC welfare maximization, this paper analyzes the problem by constructing a series of scenarios in which the less developed country would be led to reduce the...

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will propose an algorithmic model and a non-binding scheme to help...

Why is good good and bad bad? Kant's categorical imperative (KCI) and instrumental rationality are analyzed under the game-theoretical framework of the folk theorem. Prescribing different courses of action under the one-shot game, Kant's categorical imperative emerges as instrumentally rational...

This paper introduces a new factor, environment, into nuclear arms race model. In this model, nuclear weapons produce larger defense power compared with conventional arms, but hurt the environment meanwhile. In the global welfare maximum level, both conventional and nuclear weapons budget are...

Scholars and policymakers have devoted much attention to issues of third party intervention in conflict. The present paper considers a conflict that draws two countervailing outside interveners. As in the realist perspective, the outside parties are drawn to intervene through some economic or...