Tax authorities utilize the audit process, imposing penalties on tax evaders, as their primary means of enforcement. In recent years, a “service” paradigm, whereby tax authorities provide information about correct tax reporting to taxpayers, has shown the potential to further “encourage”...

In this paper, we model - quantitatively – a possible realistic interaction between a tax-payer and his Government. We formalize, in a general setting, this strategic interaction. Moreover, we analyze "completely" a particular realistic sample of the general model. We determine the entire...

The proposed theoretical work introduces the basic insights of the ‘slippery slope’ framework into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market in order to study the relation between tax compliance (both voluntary and enforced), tax evasion and unemployment. This paper shows that...

Using the most current data available, this study seeks to identify any new as well as traditional determinants of personal income tax evasion. A variety of empirical estimates find that income tax rates, the IRS audit rate and IRS penalty interest rates, and the unemployment rate all influence...

This study empirically examines the impact of federal income tax rates, IRS penalties on unpaid tax liabilities, and audit rates by the Internal Revenue Service on the size of the underground economy in the United States. Recent data generated by Edgar Feige are used to measure the size of the...

This study empirically investigates the determinants of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion in the U.S. using the most current IRS data available. In 2010, the IRS released a new series on personal income tax evasion data running through the year 2005. Using this new data, the present...

The main object of this paper is the study of tax evasion from a theoretical point of view. We construct a simple two-player model in order to analyze the interaction between the taxpayer and the IRS and the main tool we use is game theory. We derive equilibrium solutions for the static game and...

We analyze the tax evasion problem with social interaction among the taxpayers. If the authority commits to a fixed auditing probability, a positive share of cheating is obtained in equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the existing literature, which yields full compliance of audited taxpayers...

A real, almost palpable, connection exists between the official and the underground economy. More than that, both sides of the economy (official and underground) are connected with the competitiveness of a country. Strangely a large presence of undereground in the economy is a sign of...

Using a simple model of income redistribution, we show that the government may use tax evasion as a way to redistribute income from the non- evaders to evaders. This will result then to a negative association between income inequality and per capita transfers and inefficiently high taxes.