The existence of an economic dividend - in terms of regional disparities -of the global devolutionary trend registered over the past three decades is still ambiguous both on theoretical and empirical grounds and it is likely to be casespecific. With respect to the Italian case it has been argued...

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The...

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning...

This paper examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his...

The paper written from a governance perspective takes the position that a useful governance perspective must be informed by the socio-economic-cultural milieu and in the specific Indian context must sit on a tripod of ‘political reality’, ‘state of decentralization’ and ‘basic economic...

In this paper, a framework is developed to consider collective action, sustainability and the capability approach with regard to resolution of water disputes, followed by a brief discussion of how identity can hinder cooperation or the development of universalism. This framework is then examined...

We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously...

Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may...

The crisis of Greater Darfur Region of Sudan extends to other regions as the South Sudan prepares for secession next July 2011. In the past eight years Sudan's crisis in Darfur was amplified by global news media all over the world. Civil conflict erupted, developed into armed rebellions and open...

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments,...