We devise a nonparametric test of strategic behavior in a multiproduct Cournot oligopoly. It is assumed that firms have cost functions that do not change over the period of observation but that market demand can change in each period. Market prices and firm-specific production quantities are...

We show that when a seller of a di¤erentiated good o¤ers the product allowing consumers an option to pay what they like, then all consumers will never free ride in equilibrium when their valuations of the good are positive, and, under certain conditions, all will consumers would pay. Further,...

In this paper we analyze incentives for a potential entrant to get into an oligopolistic Cournot-like market by taking over one of the incumbents and we derive the conditions under which the hostile merger is possible and profitable. The key-feature is that the target of the takeover is...

In this paper we apply the complete analysis of a differentiable game (recently introduced by the author) to determine possible suitable behaviors (actions) of tourism firms during strategic interactions with other tourism firms, from both non-cooperative and cooperative point of view. To...

In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make strategic decisions, and to contract with other employees. By studying a model with one principal and two agents where one agent can gather information that is valuable for the principal's project choice and the...

This paper examines the effect of salvage market on strategic technology choice and capacity investment decision of two firms that compete on the amount of output they produce under demand uncertainty. A game theoretic model applies such that in the first stage firms choose their production...

We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...

The effect of competition among self-regulatory organizations (SRO) on the efficiency of the corresponding goods and services markets is considered. It is shown that under certain conditions the competition among SRO worsens the quality of the goods and services and leads to decrease in...

The effect of the competition among self-regulatory organizations (SROs) on the efficiency of the corresponding goods and services markets is studied. It is shown that under certain conditions the competition among SROs worsens the quality of the goods and services and leads to decreasing...

We revisit Greif's (1993) analysis of trade between the 11th-century Maghribi traders and present two different models which bring into play, in an essential way, historical features of the Maghribi's organization which had no role in Greif's own analysis. Our reformulation of the Maghribi's...