We consider a delegation problem with a potentially uninformed agent when the principal cannot use monetary payments …. If the bias between the principal and the agent is large, then the optimal delegation set is an interval. When the bias … is small or medium however, the optimal delegation set is no longer connected. It can be one of two types: with an …

This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal-intermediary-agent hierarchy. In … this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We … characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when …

, Bertrand competition can be sustained with this delegation of competition mode choice. Thus, a conflict of interest between …

for each task is given to the party with necessary human capital, and hierarchical delegation where the decision authority …. Hierarchical delegation is optimal in the intermediate case. We also discuss the optimal pattern of hierarchical delegation as well …