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Firm characteristics, labor sorting, and wages

Alcala, Francisco; Hernandez, Pedro J. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

We analyze in a simple model the consequences of efficiency heterogeneity at the firm level for the sorting of workers with different skills into firms with different characteristics. We show that more efficient firms tend to produce higher quality output in equilibrium, which then translates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790421

Wage bargaining and quality competition

Bhattacharyya, Ranajoy; Saha, Bibhas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

In a standard model of vertical differentiation, wage is assumed to determine the quality. Wage is also subject to bargaining. Increased bargaining power of the worker in the low quality firm reduces quality differential, and increases price competitiveness. The Opposite happens from a similar...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021996

A Mountain Biker cannot start a journey in sixth gear: An Assessment of the U.N. Global Compact’s Use of Soft Law as a Global Governance Structure for Corporate Social Responsibili...

Ghafele, Roya; Mercer, Angus - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

The practical impossibility of employing hard law at an international level has meant that softer codes of conduct have stepped in to fill the void. The Global Compact is the most ambitious of these codes, created with a desire to engage business in the project of international development and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260197

Competing risks analysis and deposit insurance governance convergence

Christopher, Gandrud - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

Why do policies often seem to converge across countries at the same time? This question has been studied extensively in the diffusion literature. However, past research has not examined complex choice environments, especially where there are many alternatives. My paper aims to fill this gap in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422000

On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation

Choe, Chongwoo; Ishiguro, Shingo - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

for each task is given to the party with necessary human capital, and hierarchical delegation where the decision authority …. Hierarchical delegation is optimal in the intermediate case. We also discuss the optimal pattern of hierarchical delegation as well …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786967

A model of delegated project choice

Armstrong, Mark; Vickers, John - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835706

Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies

Choe, Chongwoo; In-Uck, Park - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

principal can benefit from such delegation relative to centralization. We show that beneficial delegation is possible when … complete contracts cannot be written, and delegation of authority should necessarily be to the information gatherer. The benets … of delegation stem from either efficiency gains or reduction in rent to the information gatherer. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543778

The Allocation of Decision-Making Authority when Principal has Reputation Concerns

Tamada, Yasunari; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

in°uence her reputation through her delegation policy. With reputation concerns, we show that the principal tends to keep …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545990

Delegation and discretion

Armstrong, Mark - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1995

There are many situations in which a principal delegates decisions to a better-informed agent but does not choose to give full discretion. This paper discusses one reason why this might be desirable: the agent may have tastes that differ from those of the principal. Limiting the agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109556

Strategic Vertical Separation

Sloev, Igor - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

The paper explores incentives for strategic vertical separation of firms in a framework of a simple duopoly model. Each firm chooses either to be a retailer of its own good (vertical integration) or to sell its good through an independent exclusive retailer (vertical separation). In the latter...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005037745