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Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók
Monostori, Zoltan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
A tanulmány célja az értékpapírok esetében leggyakrabban alkalmazott két aukciós technika (az egyenáras és a diszkriminatív áras aukció) összehasonlító elemzése. A szakirodalom elsősorban az aukció várható bevétele szempontjából elemzi a módszereket. Az elméleti...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258696
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Second-Price Auctions with Different Participation Costs
Cao, Xiaoyong; Tian, Guoqiang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions in independent private value envi- ronments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified: monotonic equilibria in which a bidder with a lower participation cost results in a lower cutoff for sub- mitting a bid,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260669
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Endogenous Information Acquisition on Opponents' Valuations in Multidimensional First Price Auctions
Tian, Guoqiang; Xiao, Mingjun - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
first price auction model with independent private values. Such an information acquisition setting leads to bidimensional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260981
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Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization
Said, Maher - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
ascending auction is a natural institution for achieving either efficient or optimal outcomes. Interestingly, this is not the … case for sequential second-price auctions, as the bids in a second-price auction do not reveal sufficient information to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005019437
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A model of descending auction with hidden starting price and endogenous price decrease
Di Gaetano, Luigi - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
Several new auction formats are spreading over the Internet. They have usually the aim of raising revenues by … price. The aim of this paper is to study a format of descending price auction with hidden starting price and endogenous … price decrease. In this format, usually known as price reveal auction, the price is hidden and players have to pay a fee to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401310
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Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition
Bos, Olivier - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stochastic competition …-price all-pay auction as well as the winner-pay auctions. Furthermore we investigate the expected revenue comparisons among the … war of attrition, the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auctions and discuss the Linkage Principle as well. Our findings …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368155
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Seller Competition by Mechanism Design
Damianov, Damian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
In the market game presented here, sellers offer trade mechanisms to buyers, and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit. The distribution of buyers across sellers is endogenous and depends on all of the transaction opportunities existing in the market. Sellers choose from a broad class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835726
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Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited
Dubra, Juan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an ex post efficient equilibrium without assuming differentiability of valuations or that signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835733
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The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching
Lamping, Jennifer - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
In many auctions, a good match between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties although information about the quality of the match may be incomplete. This paper examines the case in which the bidder is better informed about the quality of his match with the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490104
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Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments
Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when discriminating among agents using known differences is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008527359