This paper studies a class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called `scoring rules' after their famous counterpart in preference aggregation theory. A scoring rule delivers the collective judgments which reach the highest total `score' across the individuals, subject to the judgments having...

The theory of social choice introduced in [5,6] is robust; it is completely independent of the choice of topology on spaces of preference. This theory has been fruitful in linking diverse forms of resource allocation; it has been shown [17] that contractibility is necessary and sufficient for...

The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the `wisdom of crowds'. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises -- voter independence -- is notoriously violated. This premise carries...

How can different individuals' probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem assume that the set of relevant events -- the agenda -- is a σ-algebra and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction...

Consider a society where each agent has weak preferences over alternatives. The purpose of the society is the selection of alternatives using the majority principle. Then, an alternative x (a weak Condorcet winner) is selected if half or more agents agree that x is as least as good as any other...

How can different individuals' probability functions on a given σ-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require `event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals'...

When individual judgments ('yes' or 'no') on some propositions are aggregated into collective judgments, the agenda setter can sometimes reverse a collective judgment by changing the set of propositions under consideration (the agenda). I define different kinds of agenda manipulation, and...

We characterize a rule for aggregating binary evaluations -- equivalently, dichotomous weak orders -- similar in spirit to the Borda rule from the preference aggregation literature. The binary evaluation framework was introduced as a general approach to aggregation by Wilson (J. Econ. Theory 10...

The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called...

Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List...