In this paper I will introduce a new political economy model, where there exists a competition amongst two political candidates, which aim to set a policy which enables them to win elections, max- imising the probability of winning. I will show that, if taxes neces- sary to repay the debt are...

This work intends to specify a formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models with Single Mindedness Theory. The goal is to find an equivalent expression to the Ramsey’s rule for a political economy environment where Governments are assumed to be Leviathans rather than...

This paper studies optimal taxation in dynamic economies with increasing returns. We show that if there exists a stable open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimal rate of tax on capital income in the steady state is negative in order to eliminate the wedge between the private and the social...

As in numerous big cities in developing countries, environmental problems in Cotonou are becoming more and more severe. These problems are the result, among other factors, of the strong air pollution by the motorbike transport sector. This study, while considering health expenditures due to air...

In this paper we discuss the actual and civilizational role of the state and its management. The MBO and the same OECD accounts-financial models are not recommended.With an comparative analysis we conclude for the necessity of a more organics and strategic models of governance and not...

Social health care systems are inevitably confronted with the scarcity of resources and the resulting distributional challenges. Since prioritization implies distributional effects, decisions on respective rules should take citizens’ preferences into account. Thus, knowledge about citizens’...

Ken Arrow (1998) asks, “What has economics to say about racial discrimination?” He replies – entirely correctly – that racial “segregation within an industry – that is, firms with either all black or all white labor forces” – may be explained by economic theory, but “the...

We develop a model in which individuals choose education to improve their earnings and regulate the cultural traits they acquire via social transmission. When education makes individuals more receptive to mainstream culture, minority groups underinvest in education as a form of cultural...

We identify the complete class of transfer rules that guarantee strategyproofness of any non-increasing in completion time allocation rule for the sequencing problem. We then characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying efficiency of decision (or aggregate cost minimization), egalitarian...