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Tax evasion, information reporting, and the regressive bias hypothesis

Pinje, Jori Veng; Boserup, Simon Halphen - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

A robust prediction from the tax evasion literature is that optimal auditing induces a regressive bias in e¤ective tax rates compared to statutory rates. If correct, this will have important distributional consequences. Nevertheless, the regressive bias hypothesis has never been tested...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804701

Social structure bureaucracy and corruptionA

Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107791

A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information

Jellal, Mohamed; Garoupa, Nuno - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2002

We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113598

Unravelling the anatomy of legal corruption in India: Focusing on the ‘honest graft’ by the politicians

Pethe, Abhay; Tandel, Vaidehi; Gandhi, Sahil - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Corruption in India is ubiquitous and may be broadly identified as illegal and legal. This paper delves into the typology of legal corruption in India, which, apart from abuse of discretionary power, and tactical law and policy making, also includes – not so well documented – use of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257870

Information corruption and optimal law enforcement

Jellal, Mohamed; Garoupa, Nuno - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and enforcers, in the framework proposed by Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001). Our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying o®ense is not necessarily...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257930

Dynamic law enforcement with learning

Jellal, Mohamed; Garoupa, Nuno - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

This paper modifies a standard model of law enforcement to allow for learning by doing. We incorporate the process of … enforcement learning by assuming that the agency’s current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of … ability of future apprehension at a lower marginal cost. We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal compliance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259395

Social Interaction in Tax Evasion

Lipatov, Vilen - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We analyze the tax evasion problem with social interaction among the taxpayers. If the authority commits to a fixed auditing probability, a positive share of cheating is obtained in equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the existing literature, which yields full compliance of audited taxpayers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260229

Information-Constrained Optima with Retrading: An Externality and Its Market-Based Solution

Kilenthong, Weerachart; Townsend, Robert - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states, both with retrading in ex post spot markets. The interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality, unless...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552807

Transparency and View Regarding Nuclear Energy Before and After the Fukushima Accident: Evidence on Micro-data

Yamamura, Eiji - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

This paper examines the influence of government transparency on changing views regarding nuclear energy before and after Japan’s natural and nuclear disaster of 2011. Individual level data were used, covering 45 countries and containing 27,423 observations. It was observed in the majority of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259284

Learning in Bayesian Regulation

Koray, Semih; Saglam, Ismail - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

We examine the issue of learning in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. We show that there …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005616573

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