market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status …We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the …, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias doesn't always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a …

We analyze how financial experts influence asset prices in a sequential trading model. In the model, an expert of … information about the expert's ability is private to traders and only revealed through trades. When the expert's reputation is …

We show that the observation by a principal of the effectiveness of an expert‘s action could induce the expert to lie … then he takes an action that can match or not the real state. If a principal observes the consequences of this expert’s … "trade-off" can be affected in an unexpected way by the observation of the expert’s action consequences. In this paper, we …

Reputation systems that rely on feedback from traders are important institutions for helping sustain trust in markets … pre-commitment device for sellers in reputation systems. In particular, the pre-commitment device we study here allows …