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This paper considers the screening problem faced by a monopolist of a network good in a general setting. We demonstrate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107904
This paper considers an entry-deterring nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incumbent firm of a network good. The analysis recognizes that the installed user base/network of incumbent monopolist has preemptive power in deterring entry if the entrant’s good is incompatible with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112623
In nonlinear pricing environment with correlated types, we characterize optimal selling mechanisms when buyers could form a coalition to coordinate their reports and to arbitrage on the goods. We find that when the types of agents are weakly positively correlated, the optimal weakly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260879
This paper studies the cost requirement for two-agent collusion-proof mechanism design. Unlike the existing results for general environments with three or more agents, it is shown that collusive behavior cannot be prevented freely in two-agent nonlinear pricing environments with correlated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113604
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647384
We analyse how consumer heterogeneity affects buying behaviour and the monopoly pricing of a network good and its usage. Under perfect information, sufficiently high heterogeneity yields a unique equilibrium, and the unit price is increasing in heterogeneity. Under incomplete information, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789554
The present paper provides a descriptive analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. By imposing a simple two-sided framework with two distinct types of agents on one of its market sides, it will be shown that under incomplete information, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260128
We study general discrete-types multidimensional screening without any noticeable restrictions on valuations, using … has an in-rooted acyclic graph ("river"); (2) for any logically feasible river there exists a screening problem resulting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008923043
This paper provides a new explanation for the dominance of the low-powered incentive contract over the high-powered incentive contract using a mixed model of moral hazard and adverse selection. We first show that the power of incentives in the second-best contract is lower than that in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111626
This paper examines uberrimae fidei (utmost good faith) with adverse selection in an insurance market. If consumers know their risk type (they know their expected loss), and if they understand the concept of uberrimae fidei, adverse selection is completely eliminated. However, if uberrimae fidei...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619644