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Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence
Shupp, Robert; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259038
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Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests
Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
first stage but not in the second stage. Our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject’s utility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258638
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Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests
Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
A contest is a situation in which individuals or groups expend costly resources while competing to win a specific prize. The variety of economic situations that can be described as contests has attracted enormous attention from economic theorists. Despite the extensive theoretical research of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259262
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Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests
Mago, Shakun; Samak, Anya; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. In all treatments we find significant over-expenditure of effort relative to the standard theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259314
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Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum
Mago, Shakun; Sheremeta, Roman; Yates, Andrew - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three contest. Intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower efforts. Both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of contest ending in two rounds. The patterns of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259589
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Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests
Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the first stage, parties run their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259661
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You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups
McCarter, Matthew; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
of member change on performance? To answer these questions we conduct an experiment in which we investigate the effect of … first part of the experiment, and then two members of the group are replaced with new participants, and the newly formed … group plays the game for the second part of the experiment. Our results show that the arrival of newcomers decreases trust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259957
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Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict
Kimbrough, Erik; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a … them and then still choose to enter conflict; however, our experiment reveals that some individuals use this non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260731
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When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents
Kimbrough, Erik; Sheremeta, Roman; Shields, Timothy - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
capabilities, conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger agent prefers to fight. The results of the experiment confirm that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260837
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Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution
Kimbrough, Erik; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123534