Showing 1 - 9 of 9
We present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of optimal control problems with pure state constraints for which the objective function is linear in the state variable but the objective function is otherwise only restricted to be upper semicontinuous in the control variable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251534
An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each player’s payoff is a function only of his own strategy and an aggregate function of the strategy profile of all players. Aggregate games possess a set of purely algebraic properties that can often provide simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251547
We study games of public delegated common agency under asymmetric information. Us- ing tools from non-smooth analysis and optimal control, we derive best responses and characterize equilibria (both continuous and discontinuous) using self-generating opti- mization programs of which any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251555
This note uses techniques developed for aggregate games to characterize the set of equilib- ria for a beauty contest or prediction game in which the experts’ preferences are quadratic, but with an otherwise unrestricted information structure for private signals and the state variable. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251559
Polarized interest groups (principals) compete to influence a decision-maker (agent) through monetary contributions. This decision-maker chooses a one-dimensional policy and has private information about his ideal point. Competition between interest groups under asymmetric information yields a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005787025
We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621453
This paper uses a mechanism design approach to characterize the optimal organization of lobbying groups in a political context where those groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space. First, we derive the optimal mechanism for one single group and show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622145
We study games in which multiple principals influence the choice of a privately-informed agent by offering action-contingent payments. We characterize the equilibrium allocation set as the maximizers of an endogenous aggregate virtual-surplus program. The aggregate maximand for every equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011185691
We present a Theory of Contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset. Public enforcement relies on remedies for breach. Private enforcement comes from severing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112728