of the implicated parties who propose the punishment. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we find an independent third …This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third party independent … party vetoes not only punishment to the cooperators but punishment to the defectors as well. Compared with the case when the …

The paper presents a theoretical model with bureaucratic corruption where bribe income can leak out of an economy. In … for entrepreneurship by maximizing the welfare of the economy. We show that the corruption persists at the equilibrium … in low prosperity economies the control of leakage may induce higher level of corruption, while the opposite is true in …

potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation …

In this paper we present an experiment in which we test the effects of sequential entry on the stability of collusion …

, despite the absence of free-riding incentives. In a laboratory experiment, subjects indeed under-contribute relative to …

This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the …

contest experiments: (i) overbidding relative to the standard Nash equilibrium prediction and (ii) heterogeneous behavior of … ex-ante symmetric contestants. Based on the sample of contest experiments that we review, the median overbidding rate is …