The successful formation and long-term stability of a cooperative venture is often linked to the perceived fairness of the associated cost or resource allocation. In particular, the effectiveness of such collaborations can be hampered by the lack of a consensus view on what basis should be used...

Attribution of economic joint effects is achieved with a random order model of their relative importance. Random order consistency and elementary axioms uniquely identify linear and proportional marginal attribution. These are the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999, 2002) and Ortmann...

This paper applies principles f rom game theory to the problem o f allocating the cost o f a shared facility, such as a pipeline. The theory o f cooperative games s t r ongl y suggest s t hat no method e x i s t s for allocating costs that wi l l achieve all major policy goals. We apply results...

The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...

In a restructured power market, the network cost is to be allocated between multiple players utilizing the system in varying capacities. Cooperative game approaches based on Shapley value and Nucleolus provide stable models for embedded cost allocation of power networks. Varying network usage...

This paper proposes two generalization of the core and evaluates them on experimental data of assignment games (workers and firms negotiate wages and matching). The generalizations proposed allow for social utility components (e.g. altruism) and random utility components (e.g. logistic...

When there are three parties, it is well known that the Coase Theorem may not hold even when there are no transaction costs, due to the emptiness of the core of the corresponding cooperative game [Aivazian and Callen (1981)]. We show that the standard Coasean bargaining game involving three...

Firms sign an integration contract with the purpose of increasing their expected profits from trade and competition with third parties. Gains depend on how the contract improves the partners' production function (e.g. better synergies, organization, etc.), and how it increases their power in the...