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Employer’s moral hazard and wage rigidity
albanese, marina; navarra, cecilia; Tortia, Ermanno - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
The standard explanation of wage rigidity in principal agent and in efficiency wage models is related to worker risk-aversion. However, these explanations do not consider at least two important classes of empirical evidence: (1) In worker cooperatives workers appear to behave in a less risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260540
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Beyond Extended Phenotype Evolution of extended identity in order to reconcile study of humanity with biological evolution
Mezgebo, Taddese - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
The question: “How much of biological evolution based theories, as they are understood presently, apply to human behaviour?” is highly controversial and perhaps highly politicized as well. The inference that human beings are evolutionarily programmed to have urges toward aggression, rape,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258986
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Money Talks? An Experimental Study of Rebate in Reputation System Design
Li, Lingfang; Xiao, Erte - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Reputation systems that rely on feedback from traders are important institutions for helping sustain trust in markets …-seller trust game with a unilateral feedback scheme, we find that a buyer’s propensity to leave feedback is more sensitive to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008560983
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L'influence de la connaissance du genre du partenaire dans les relations de confiance et de réciprocité: une étude expérimentale
Bonein, Aurélie; Serra, Daniel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
Gender differences are often observed in real life-situations. We implement an experiment on the investment game which … explores the influence of knowledge of partner's gender in trust and reciprocity by means of two treatments of information: the … great heterogeneity of individuals’ behaviors is observed: from selfish behavior to complete trust and trustworthiness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005787126
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The empirics of social capital and economic development: a critical perspective
Fabio, Sabatini - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
This paper provides an introduction to the concept of social capital, and carries out a critical review of the empirical literature on social capital and economic development. The survey points out six main weaknesses affecting the empirics of social capital. Identified weaknesses are then used...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835508
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Why is the Workplace Racially Segregated by Occupation?
Naqvi, Nadeem - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
Ken Arrow (1998) asks, “What has economics to say about racial discrimination?” He replies – entirely correctly – that racial “segregation within an industry – that is, firms with either all black or all white labor forces” – may be explained by economic theory, but “the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260187
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On the (Non)-Lattice Structure of Equilibrium Sets in Games with Strategic Substitutes
Roy, Sunanda - 2020
This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824357
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On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2002
A buyer and a seller can exchange one unit of an indivisible good. While producing the good, the seller can exert unobservable effort (hidden action). Then the buyer realizes whether his valuation is high or low, which stochastically depends upon the seller's effort level (hidden information)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622105
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On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
A seller and a buyer can write a contract. After that, the seller produces a good. She can influence the expected quality of the good by making unobservable investments. Only the seller learns the realized quality. Finally, trade can occur. It is always ex post efficient to trade. Yet, it may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568373
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"A Theory of Migration as a Response to Occupational Stigma"
Stark, Oded; Fan, Simon C. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
A theory is developed of labor migration that is prompted by a desire to avoid "social humiliation." In a general equilibrium framework it is shown that as long as migration can reduce humiliation sufficiently, migration will occur even between two identical economies. Migration increases the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008516590