This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...

In the framework Hotelling-Downs competition two players can freely choose a position along a one-dimensional market. We introduce restrictions of feasible strategies and analyze the consequences for players and consumers. In equilibrium players may minimally differentiate away from the center...

We analyze a two-period licensing game in which a non-producer upstream patent holder licenses an innovation to either one or two downstream licensees for a payment based on the licensee’s expected per-period profit. Licensees have private information about the innovation’s value, and their...

We investigate the dynamic relationship between advertising and product quality under duopolistic competition. By using a simplified vertical product differentiation model with voluntary advertising, we show that the firm with larger market share has a larger advertising share and that there is...

If Cournot oligopolists may sell their output prior to its production (forward trading), competition intensifies. Potentially, it may intensify so far as to imply convergence to the Bertrand equilibrium, as shown by Allaz and Vila (1993) for the case of linear demand and costs. The present paper...

Prior research has shown, on the one hand, that firms subject to a cap-and-trade system can enjoy scarcity rents and, on the other hand, that cost effectiveness in a competitive emission permit market could be affected by tacit collusion and price manipulation when the corresponding polluting...