Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot coordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explanatory power of models with multiple...

Considerable experimental evidence has been collected on how to solve the public-good dilemma. In a 'first generation' of experiments, this was done by presenting subjects with a pre-specified game out of a huge variety of rules. A 'second generation' of experiments introduced subjects to two...

A possibility of the existence of a discontinuity of Prelec’s (probability weighting) function W(p) at the probability p = 1 is discussed. This possibility is supported by the Aczél–Luce question whether Prelec’s weighting function W(p) is equal to 1 at p = 1, by the purely mathematical...

A need for experiments on the certainty effect near the certainty (near the probability p = 1) is stated in this paper. The need supported by the Aczél–Luce question whether Prelec’s weighting function W(p) is equal to 1 at p = 1, by the purely mathematical restrictions and the...

Despite normative predictions from economics and biology, unrelated strangers will often develop the trust necessary to reap gains from one-shot economic exchange opportunities. This appears to be especially true when declared intentions and emotions can be cheaply communicated. Perhaps even...

Despite the distinctive character of the Austrian approach to “microfoundations for macroeconomics”, the literature on free banking contains a number of arguments which make use of game-theoretic concepts and models such as the well-known Prisoner´s Dilemma model. While there can be no...