Showing 1 - 10 of 127
In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we collected information on the female participants' menstrual cycles. We find that women bid significantly higher than men in their menstrual and premenstrual phase but do not bid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976975
In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we scan also the right hand of each subject. We study how the ratio of the length of the index and ring fingers (2D:4D) of the right hand, a measure of prenatal hormone exposure, is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976978
In this paper we study a multi-stage elimination contest with non-sunk bids: differently from existing literature, we realize that when players are budget-constrained, they do not regard past bids as strategically irrelevant in their decision of how much to bid in following stages. This happens...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107336
As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107706
In the ascending-price auctions with Yahoo!-type buy-it-now (BIN), we characterize and derive the closed-form solution for the optimal bidding strategy of the bidder and the optimal BIN price of the seller when they are both risk-averse. The seller is shown to be strictly better o with the BIN...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108134
I present a two-player nested contest which is a convex combination of two widely studied contests: the Tullock (lottery) contest and the all-pay auction. A Nash equilibrium exists for all parameters of the nested contest. If and only if the contest is sufficiently asymmetric, then there is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108739
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly forecast of a future event (such as a meteorological phenomenon) or a probabilistic estimate of a specific parameter (such as the quality of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109324
We investigate a private value auction in which a single "entrant" on winning imposes a negative externality on two "regular" bidders. In an English auction, when all bidders are active "regulars" free ride, exiting before price reaches their value. In a first-price sealed-bid auction incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109670
This paper provides a price equilibrium existence theorem in economies where commodities may be indivisible and aggregate excess demand functions may be discontinuous. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity, called recursive transfer lower semi-continuity, which is weaker than transfer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109908
This paper considers a two-stage game, where in the first stage, two firms bid non-cooperatively for a production technique that leads to a reduction in cost. Following the auction in the second stage of the game these firms compete against each other in a duopolistic industry. The amount of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109964