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We study optimal incentives in a principal-agent problem in which the agent's outside option is determined endogenously in a competitive labor market. In equilibrium, strong performance increases the agent's market value. When this value becomes sufficiently high, the threat of the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108859
This paper discusses the design of a novel multi-dimensional mechanism which allows a principal to procure a single project or an item from multiple suppliers through a two-step payment. The suppliers are capable of producing different qualities at costs which cannot exceed a certain value and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259763
insureds to discover their risk type and/or educating potential insureds on the requirements of a contract of uberrimae fidei …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619644
This paper is a theoretical introduction to modern governance of universities in developing countries. Indeed, adopting the approach of the paradigm of the theory of incentives Laffont and Tirole (1993), this paper discusses the effects of the presence of information asymmetry between the State...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108454
Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a … cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … the principals make contract offers, they anticipate that social preferences affect agents' behavior. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110481
This paper explores the rationality of status concerns amongst co-workers and the impact of such rational status concerns on a firm's profits. We find that it is individually rational for agents in a firm to develop and exhibit status concerns. Workers are, by their choices of status concerns,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540966
We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839203
"incentivize" teaching activity is decreasing the incentive power to researching activity. This justifies the low-powered contract … to tenured professors. However, with low-powered contract, the university will face serious informational problem in the … from the potential occupational vacancy if the wage level is low. To this dilemma, the up-or-out contract is a possible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008544697
The application of Nash bargaining solution to profit division in negotiation between opencast lignite mine and power plant has been discussed. Different proposals of status quo point usage and ways of its determination for profit sharing both in strategic and tactical/operational negotiation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260247
The unconventional monetary policy actions of the Federal Reserve during the recent Global Financial Crisis often involve implicit subsidies to banks. This paper offers a theory of the non-neutrality of money associated with capital injection into banks via nominal transfers, in an environment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294914