We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the … market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status … if reports are not public. Finally, sequential consultation of experts reduces the information obtained when reports are …

toward some favoured decision but cares also about its reputation on the market for experts. We then analyse the … on experts biased against the status quo. We also show that it is optimal to publically disclose the expert report …

We analyze how financial experts influence asset prices in a sequential trading model. In the model, an expert of … information about the expert's ability is private to traders and only revealed through trades. When the expert's reputation is …

Reputation systems that rely on feedback from traders are important institutions for helping sustain trust in markets … pre-commitment device for sellers in reputation systems. In particular, the pre-commitment device we study here allows …

This paper incorporates learning and reputation building into a simple dynamic stochastic model of international trade … reputation, namely U.S. imports of Japanese cars over the period 1961-2005. Numerical simulations replicate the trade flow in a … international trade patterns. Since learning and reputation building require time, predicted short run trade patterns can be quite …

particular, the sender has a finite set of message elements with which to compose messages. The sender incurs a communication … uniqueness and we provide an example where an increase in communication costs can improve communication. As we show in an example … payoffs in mediated communication. …