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In an auction with a buy price, a seller offers bidders the opportunity to forgo competing in an auction by transacting immediately at a pre-specified fixed price. If a seller has aspirations in the form of a reference price that depends upon the auction's reserve price and buy price, she does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005079307
This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions in independent private value envi- ronments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified: monotonic equilibria in which a bidder with a lower participation cost results in a lower cutoff for sub- mitting a bid,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260669
Several new auction formats are spreading over the Internet. They have usually the aim of raising revenues by increasing the number of participant, who will pay a participation fee, rather than selling the object at the highest possible price. The aim of this paper is to study a format of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401310
I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an ex post efficient equilibrium without assuming differentiability of valuations or that signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835733
In many auctions, a good match between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties although information about the quality of the match may be incomplete. This paper examines the case in which the bidder is better informed about the quality of his match with the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490104
After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid offer. This paper seeks to determine what measures the seller should take to maximize his share of the surplus when bidders are privately informed about their risk of default. Special attention is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532158
In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However, information about the quality of the match may be incomplete. We consider the case in which each bidder observes the quality of his match with the seller but the seller does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532170
As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107706
This paper provides a price equilibrium existence theorem in economies where commodities may be indivisible and aggregate excess demand functions may be discontinuous. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity, called recursive transfer lower semi-continuity, which is weaker than transfer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109908
This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and participation costs are both privation information and are drawn from general distribution functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that there always exists an equilibrium for this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112898