direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is … number of the game. The same is true if we replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained by … deleting from the agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal for all players in a winning coalition. Unlike the core, the …

core" and show that the subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations of the intermediation game are contained in the … intermediation core, similar to the inclusion of competitive equilibrium allocations in the core usually studied. We also identify …, in terms of the supporting intermediary structures, intermediation core allocations which are also subgame …

question of core stability of the grand coalition, namely: is there a subset of bidders that prefers forming a small bidding … the grand coalition is not necessarily core stable, as opposed to the zero externality case, where the stability of the …

neither arbitrarily small coalitions nor large coalitions are enough to block an allocation which is not in the core, due to … the core provided by Vind and Schmeidler (1972) to economies with asymmetrically informed traders. We then focus on … finest information. Finally, characterizations for the weak fine, the fine and the private core are obtained as particular …

: (a) equivalence of the core and the set of competitive outcomes; (b) the Shapley value is contained in the core or … approximate cores; (c) the equal treatment property holds -- that is, both market equilibrium and the core treat similar players …