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Transaction Costs can Encourage Coasean Bargaining
Robson, Alex - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
When there are three parties, it is well known that the Coase Theorem may not hold even when there are no transaction costs, due to the emptiness of the core of the corresponding cooperative game [Aivazian and Callen (1981)]. We show that the standard Coasean bargaining game involving three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107924
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Petróleo: peligro mortal. Unas islas alquitranadas
Costa, Cirer; Carles, Joan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
tourism and that a large spill can destroy the current complex economic structure, turning it into one that is much simpler in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113619
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Understanding the Impact of Immigration on Crime
Spenkuch, Jörg L. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Since the 1960s both crime rates and the share of immigrants among the American population have more than doubled …. Almost three quarters of Americans believe immigration increases crime, yet existing academic research has shown no such … economically meaningful impact of immigration on crime. Consistent with the economic model of crime this effect is strongest for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008595620
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Understanding "The Problem of Social Cost"
baffi, enrico - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
This paper examines the positions of Coase and Pigou in regard to the problem of external effects (externalities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260441
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One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences
Mumcu, Ayse; Saglam, Ismail - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem that allows for the prospect of being single, and study the existence and properties of stable matchings. We obtain the relationship between the stable set, the core, and the Pareto set, and give a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836394
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Market Based, Segregated Exchanges with Default Risk
Kilenthong, Weerachart; Townsend, Robert - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
trade in ex ante asset backed securities) creates externalities, as spot prices (or security prices) and the bindingness of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552792
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Information-Constrained Optima with Retrading: An Externality and Its Market-Based Solution
Kilenthong, Weerachart; Townsend, Robert - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states, both with retrading in ex post spot markets. The interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality, unless...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552807
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The Value of Commitment: Marriage Choice in the Presence of Costly Divorce
Yurko, Anna - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Two individuals may choose to enter a coresidential relationship, which may or may not include joint property ownership and raising children. In addition to that, individuals may decide to formalize this contractual relationship by holding a marriage ceremony. The literature on coresidential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468155
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On the Generalized Weitzman's Rule
Mino, Kazuo - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004
Weitzman (1976) provides a foundation for net national product of a competitive economy as the annuity equivalent of the present discounted value of maximized consumption. This paper considers how Weitzman's rule should be modified if the competitive equilibrium is affected by the presence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005105915
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Charitable asymmetric bidders
Olivier, Bos - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
Recent papers show that all-pay auctions are better at raising money for charity than first-price auctions with symmetric bidders and under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with sufficiently asymmetric bidders and under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009148030