In response to the recent Financial Crisis - after it had been widely accepted that “a serious disturbance in the economy of Member States” had occurred, and that several measures were required to remedy this disturbance, various Commission communications were adopted. The Communications...

Despite Basel III’s efforts to address capital and liquidity requirements, will the risks linked to regulatory arbitrage increase as a result of Basel III’s more stringent capital and liquidity rules? As well as Basel III reforms which are geared towards greater facilitation of financial...

The ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe and U.S. is challenging the conventional wisdom and is creating fears of a double dip recession in 2012. Massive levels of debt and consumption beyond means and speedy financial innovation with lax regulation has put major economies in a deep hole....

Sir John Vickers (Chairman of the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking (2011)), published a discussion paper entitled “Some Economics of Banking Reform” (Vickers (2012)). This is my contribution to the “discussion”, that is, I make some criticisms of the paper. The Independent...

A panel regression gives evidence that more flexibility in Asian exchange rates reduces risk associated with bank borrowing abroad, but deviations from mean exchange rates, and from the renminbi, increase risk. Since the exchange rate regime affects bank behavior and the incentives to hedge, the...

In absence of bank risk-taking behavior, opacity is defined as the inability of depositors, speculators and central banker to disentangle default risk and asset's return from the asset's value. We show the conditions under which opacity leads to runs on a solvent bank in equilibrium and...

We model a typical Asian-crisis-economy using dynamic general equilibrium tech-niques. Exchange rates obtain from nontrivial fiat-currencies demands. Sudden stops/bank-panics are possible, and key for evaluating the merits of alternative ex-change rate regimes. Strategic complementarities...

Once relegated to cinema or history lectures, bank runs have become a modern phenomenon that captures the interest of students. We use a simple classroom experiment based upon the Diamond-Dybvig Model (1983) to demonstrate how a bank run, a seemingly irrational event, can occur rationally. We...

We study a coordination problem where agents act sequentially. Agents are embedded in an observation network that allows them to observe the actions of their neighbors. We find that coordination failures do not occur if there exists a sufficiently large clique. Its existence is necessary and...

We modify the Diamond-Dybvig [3] model studied in Green and Lin [5] to incorporate a self-interested banker who has a private record-keeping technology. A public record-keeping device does not exist. We find that there is a trade-off between sophisticated contracts that possess relatively good...