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State of Governance in Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects.
Ahmad, Sayed Javed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
’ve kept the scope of this paper limited to political party, elections and governance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005623480
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Governing of Agro-Ecosystem Services
Bachev, Hrabrin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analysis of mechanisms of governance … of agro-ecosystem services. Firstly, we present a new approach for analysis and improvement of governance of agro … modes of governance. Secondly, we identify spectrum of market and private forms of governance of agro-ecosystem services …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025716
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Why do Facebook and Twitter facilitate revolutions more than TV and radio?
Kiss, Hubert Janos; Rosa-García, Alfonso - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
A distinctive feature of recent revolutions was the key role of social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube). In a simple model we assume that while social media allow to observe all previous decisions, mass media only give aggregate information about the state of a revolt. We show, first,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009322656
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Agro-Ecosystem Services – Governance Needs and Efficiency
Bachev, Hrabrin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
agro-ecosystem services includes: definition of the agro-ecosystem services and the governance; specification of governance … needs of agro-ecosystem services and the spectrum of available governing modes (formal and informal institutions, market …, private, public and hybrid forms); assessment of efficiency of different modes of governance in terms of their potential to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684891
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Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009
Brams, Steven J.; Camilo, Gustavo; Franz, Alexandra D. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
We apply a fallback model of coalition formation to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the seven natural courts, which had the same members for at least two terms, between 1969 and 2009. The predictions of majority coalitions on each of the courts are generally bourn out by the 5-4...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004820
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Discovering the dynamics of smart business networks
Pau, Louis-François - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
and governance, into business genetics [1] based on strategic bonds or decay and opportunistic complementarities. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021995
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A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R; Kilgour, D. Marc - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism that induces two bargainers to be truthful in reporting their reservation prices in a 1st stage. If these prices criss-cross, the referee reports that they overlap, and the bargainers proceed to make offers in a 2nd stage. The average of the 2nd-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839490
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Are Kant's categorical imperative and instrumental rationality incompatible? The case for the prisoner's dilemma
Brinca, Pedro - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
Why is good good and bad bad? Kant's categorical imperative (KCI) and instrumental rationality are analyzed under the game-theoretical framework of the folk theorem. Prescribing different courses of action under the one-shot game, Kant's categorical imperative emerges as instrumentally rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011170133
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The Instability of Power Sharing
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
Three models are presented in which two players agree to share power in a particular ratio, but either player may subsequently “fire” at the other, as in a duel, to try to eliminate it. The players have positive probabilities of eliminating each other by firing. If neither is successful, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619418
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Stabilizing Power Sharing
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
Power sharing is modeled as a duel over some prize. Each of two players may either share the prize in some ratio or fire at the other player—either in sequence or simultaneously—and eliminate it with a specified probability. If one player eliminates the other without being eliminated itself,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619768