The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...

This paper proposes two generalization of the core and evaluates them on experimental data of assignment games (workers and firms negotiate wages and matching). The generalizations proposed allow for social utility components (e.g. altruism) and random utility components (e.g. logistic...

The successful formation and long-term stability of a cooperative venture is often linked to the perceived fairness of the associated cost or resource allocation. In particular, the effectiveness of such collaborations can be hampered by the lack of a consensus view on what basis should be used...

This paper considers cooperative game theoretic settings in which forming coalitions can act as Stackelberg leaders. We de�fine a value function which modi�fies the gamma-value function (Hart & Kurz, 1983, Chander & Tulkens, 1997) by letting members of deviating coalitions move �first in...

We present a novel algorithm to determine the payoff-space of certain normal-form C1 parametric games, and - more generally - of continuous families of normal-form C1 games. The algorithm has been implemented by using MATLAB, and it has been applied to several examples. The implementation of the...

When there are three parties, it is well known that the Coase Theorem may not hold even when there are no transaction costs, due to the emptiness of the core of the corresponding cooperative game [Aivazian and Callen (1981)]. We show that the standard Coasean bargaining game involving three...

Firms sign an integration contract with the purpose of increasing their expected profits from trade and competition with third parties. Gains depend on how the contract improves the partners' production function (e.g. better synergies, organization, etc.), and how it increases their power in the...