In the classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv problem of demand for insurance contracts, it is well-known that the optimal insurance contract for an insurance buyer – or decision maker (DM) – is a deductible contract, when the insurer is a risk-neutral Expected-Utility (EU) maximizer, and when the DM...

Bayesian rationality is the paradigm of rational behavior in neoclassical economics. A rational agent in an economic model is one who maximizes her subjective expected utility and consistently revises her beliefs according to Bayes’s rule. The paper raises the question of how, when and why...

It is assumed that human knowledge-building depends on a discrete sequential decision-making process subjected to a stochastic information transmitting environment. This environment randomly transmits Shannon type information-packets to the decision-maker, who examines each of them for relevancy...

In many models of interdependent preferences the payoffs have not only personal value but also enter the social part of the utility. This duality creates a problem of distinguishing what influences the choice more: consumption or social concerns. To identify what drives the behavior it is...

How can different individuals' probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem assume that the set of relevant events -- the agenda -- is a σ-algebra and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction...

This paper is a supplement to Ghossoub [11]. In this supplement, some of the results of Ghossoub [11], as well as the techniques used to obtain these result are extended to a more general problem of demand for contingent claims with belief heterogeneity. Moreover, a general problem of monotone...

This paper characterizes different belief revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upon learning some event, Jeffrey revision upon learning new probabilities of some events, Adams revision upon learning some new conditional probabilities, and `dual-Jeffrey' revision upon learning...

What is the relationship between degrees of belief and (all-or-nothing) beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former, without running into paradoxes? We reassess this “belief-binarization” problem from the perspective of judgmentaggregation theory. Although some...

How can different individuals' probability functions on a given σ-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require `event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals'...

This review article introduces and evaluates various ways to aggregate probabilistic opinions of different individuals. For each of these three ways, an axiomatic characterization result is presented (a new one in the case of multiplicative pooling). The three ways satisfy different axioms and...