We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and enforcers, in the framework proposed by Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001). Our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying o®ense is not necessarily...

We analyze the tax evasion problem with social interaction among the taxpayers. If the authority commits to a fixed auditing probability, a positive share of cheating is obtained in equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the existing literature, which yields full compliance of audited taxpayers...

We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions...

According to a wide literature persons are not able to evaluate their own skills and knowledge, but the discussion on the nature, extension and determinants of this phenomenon is still open. This paper aims at proposing new empirical evidence on overconfidence and its determinants, trying to...

This paper presents an empirical micro-simulation model of the teaching and the testing process in the classroomH. It is a non-econometric micro-simulation model describing informational behaviors of the pupils, based on the observation of the pupils’ communication behavior during lessons and...