, while feedback information is usually considered a public good. We apply both theoretical models and experiments to study …

We use a laboratory experiment to test the impacts of uncertainty, the magnitude of fines and aversion against making …

problem and Rubinstein bargaining. When players are naive about their own time consistency and sophisticated about their … opponent's, the common pool problem is exacerbated, and Rubinstein bargaining breaks down completely. …

We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in …. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases wasteful effort. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not … improved information feedback decreases the heterogeneity of effort. …

-specific information in the group effort levels chosen by players in an experimental CPR game. We examine two basic treatments, one with … incomplete information and the other with complete information. In the former, subjects are informed only about their own … provision of subject-specific performance information (i.e. individual’s effort levels and payoffs) improve or worsen the …

information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing it. We design a public goods experiment in which participants … can pay to view information about identities and contributions of group members. We compare this to a treatment in which … there is no identifiable information, and a treatment in which all contributors are identified. Our main findings are that …