courses and courses have implicit preferences for students. This formulates a many-to-many matching problem. We show the … inefficiencies of the current mechanism and propose new competing mechanisms called Pareto-improving draft and dictatorship … mechanisms, which introduce ties into students' preferences. Our mechanisms generate (group) stable and Pareto …

optimal for the seller to do away with any matching considerations and allocate the contract on the basis of price alone. If … matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal mechanism may be implemented without commitment. However, if … matching is not sufficiently important, the seller suffers a loss when he is unable to commit. The magnitude of this loss …

) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …

In this paper, we use experimental data to study players' stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report … without feedback. We document a high degree of stability within the same (strategically equivalent) game, although time and … changes in the presentation of the game do lead to less stability. To look at stability across different games, we adopt the …