This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal-intermediary-agent hierarchy. In … this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We … characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when …

We consider a delegation problem with a potentially uninformed agent when the principal cannot use monetary payments …. If the bias between the principal and the agent is large, then the optimal delegation set is an interval. When the bias … is small or medium however, the optimal delegation set is no longer connected. It can be one of two types: with an …

(1995), into which collusion and renegotiation possibilities among agents are incorporated. In this model, we prove that … there exists a linear and stationary optimal compensation scheme which is also immune to collusion and renegotiation. …

principal-agent supervisor setting and prove that the recruitment of family members may be seen as a device against collusion …

agent's performance, but could result in vertical collusion. This paper demonstrates that collusion-proofness can require an … inefficiently high payment to the supervisor, and too low powered incentives for the agent. The eventuality of collusion is further …

transaction with taxpayer. The combat against collusion may explain the greater reliance on indirect taxes than on direct taxes …

This paper presents a model of collusion in vertically differentiated industries where firms have the option to make … quality dimension and their beliefs satisfy a standard refinement, collusion is facilitated in the absence of brands. More … precisely, we show that if collusion is feasible with brands it is also feasible without them …