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State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data

Simplice A, Asongu; Oasis, Kodila-Tedika - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

This paper assesses the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa using hitherto unexplored variables in … being a function of rent seeking and/or lobbying by de facto power holders is tested. The resulting interesting finding is … that, political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigating the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261165

Endogenous dynamic academic research culture

Jellal, Mohamed; Faria, Joao; Elaoufi, Noureddine - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

This paper models a dynamic scholar’s allocation of time between academia and professional activities outside academia, given the academic labor market and social interactions. The model shows how particularly in less developed countries business and political networks may have large negative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258976

The Political Economy of State Government Subsidy Adoption: The Case of Ethanol

Mark, Skidmore; Chad, Cotti; James, Alm - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

In this paper we examine the factors that determine the adoption of state economic development incentives in the ethanol industry. We compile data on the implementation dates for subsidies/tax credits for all states for years 1984-2007, a period that covers the complete emergence of the biofuel...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009328123

Gestion publique du périmètre irrigué : Accord informel, corruption et recherche de rente

Ben said, Hayet - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

Abstract The public water management in irrigated perimeter is marked by some failures. We can mention the theft of water, corruption and rent-seeking. These failures result in wastage of this scarce resource. We propose to study the public management of irrigated perimeter using the theory of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009353529

Institutional Trap

Polterovich, Victor - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

One of the main obstacles for successful economic development is the formation of institutional traps, inefficient yet stable norms of behaviour. Domination of barter exchange, arrears, corruption and black market activities are examples of institutional traps that have hampered reforms in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596422

Rent-seeking measurement in coal mining by means of labour unrest: an application of the distance function

Rodriguez-Alvarez, Ana; Del Rosal, Ignacio; Baños … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2002

We propose a method based on the distance function to empirically estimate the social cost arising from rent seeking behaviour in declining industries. Due to import competition, the factors of a particular industry undergo losses in real income, and have incentives to seek protection. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789930

Institutional Traps and Transition

Polterovich, Victor - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1999

Two myths have harmed many economies throughout the world. One is the theory of absolute advantage of central planning over the market mechanism, and the other is the belief that efficient markets develop spontaneously and quickly enough if appropriate economic legislation is established....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008561156

Incremental Reform and Distortions in China’s Product and Factor Markets

Zhang, Xiaobo; Tan, Kong-Yam - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

The purpose of economic reform is to reduce distortions and enhance efficiency. However, when reforms are partial and incremental, individuals and local governments are often able to capture the rent inherent in the gradual transition process. Young (2000) warned that such rent-seeking behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836987

Rent Seeking, Tax Policy, and Economic Growth

Polterovich, Victor - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2001

It is suggested a Romer-Barro - type model of endogenous economic growth where producers contest for distribution of a fixed share of the government’s tax revenue. The proportional contest mechanism is assumed. We studied conditions under which consumers gain or lose due to existence of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543509

Институциональные ловушки: есть ли выход?

Polterovich, Victor - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

Any legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552800

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